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Proposed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code is, like all 
commercial codification initiatives, a product of time and circumstance. 
The law would apply product quality jurisprudence to an evolving 
property form-the tangible/intangible hybrid that is the software li-
cense. In this Article, Professor Alces describes the Article 2B drafters' 
approach to the implied warranty of merchantability, concluding that 
the draft's formulation is inconsiderate of commercial and jurispruden-
tial realities. He surveys the contract and tort bases of warranties as they 
are formulated in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to support 
the conclusion that Article 2B has failed to come to terms with the fit 
between commercial law's warranty regime and the complementary 
body of product quality law. Professor Alces then describes how courts 
determined to do justice might consult strict products liability law 
when Article 2B's implied warranty of merchantability fails to respond 
to the demands of technologically sophisticated commerce. The new 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability may provide disap-
pointed licensees the protections that an impotent merchantability war-
ranty would deny them. This result could be avoided were Article 2B 's 
implied warranty of merchantability drafted after the technology it 
would govern has been afforded the time to mature toward repose. 
INTRODUCTION 
I am a curmudgeon, and Frederick Beutel is one of my heroes.1 I 
do not think that we need a special article of the Uniform Commercial 
Code governing software licenses yet.2 As a general matter, the integrity 
of the U.C.C. must be maintained against the slings and arrows of out-
rageous codification. Because the technology that a uniform software 
1. See Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be 
Adopted, 61 YALE W. 334 (1952). 
2. See Marion W. Benfield, Jr. & Peter A. Alces, Reinventing the Wheel, 35 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 1405 (1994). 
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license law would govern has not reached anything even approaching 
repose, it is impossible to draft a U.C.C. software article in the best 
Llewellynesque tradition. But the particular focus of my scorn in this 
Article is the operation of a warranty of merchantability in non-
consumer transactions under Article 2B. 
The drafters of Article 2B have maintained that the U.C.C. Article 2 
formulation of the implied warranty of merchantability would be 
impotent in the non-mass-market software-license setting because the 
implied warranty of merchantability turns on the product's "ordinary 
purpose": "[F]or custom and other non-mass-market programs, a 
comparison to ordinary works of the same type is often meaningless 
and is at odds with the common law that applies in many development 
contracts."3 This statement reiterated the position the reporter had taken 
in the notes to the February 1998 Draft of Article 2B: 
[T]he substantive question here deals with whether merchant-
ability is a relevant standard and at all protective in cases where 
software is often relatively unique. For example, assume a com-
mercial computer program that provides data compression func-
tions on an ABC computer with an XYZ operating system. 
Merchantability would ask whether that product passes without 
objection among all data compression products of all types (e.g., 
mass market, Windows-based, Apple systems, etc.) even though 
the particular environment, approach and capabilities of this 
product may be unique. How that standard protects the licensee 
is not clear and in fact it may set out standards well below what 
the documentation provides.4 
The reason given for eliminating the implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity in non-mass-market licensing transactions-that it does not make 
sense to talk of the ordinary purpose of custom-designed software-
confuses ordinariness of purpose (e.g., data compression) with ordinari-
ness of means (e.g., the particular software design that accomplishes the 
compression). It is as erroneous as suggesting that a newly designed 
automobile tire cannot be subject to the Article 2 implied warranty of 
merchantability because the innovative design does an ordinary thing in 
a new way. Such a narrow understanding of the implied warranty of 
3. U.C.C. art. 2B discussion memo of Mar. 10, 1998, at 1 (Draft, Mar. 1998). [All versions of 
Article 2B are available on the Internet. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts of Official Site (last modified Sept. 2, 1998) 
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/ulc.htm>. The Official Site offers the Article 2B drafts in 
several file formats, among which the pagination is inconsistent. In this Article and throughout this 
issue of the California Law Review, page references are to the pages as they are numbered in the 
Acrobat PDF file format. Only the prefaces to the drafts are cited by page number; all other material 
is cited by section number. The draft of August 1, 1998, has no page numbers in its on-line versions, 
and therefore the preface of that draft is eitcd without page references. Ed.] 
4. U.C.C. § 2B-403 general note 4 (Draft, Feb. 1998). 
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merchantability in the custom-designed software context is uncommer-
cial and inconsistent with the demands of product quality law. 
A look at the development of Article 2B's warranty of merchant-
ability helps to demonstrate this failing. The February 1998 Draft of 
Article 2B 's implied warranty of merchantability provided: 
(c) In cases not governed by subsection (a) [mass-market li-
censes] ... a licensor that is a merchant with respect to computer 
programs of that kind warrants to its licensee that: 
(1) any physical medium on which the program is delivered 
is merchantable; and 
(2) the computer program will perform in substantial con-
formance with any promises or affirmations of fact contained in 
the documentation provided by the licensor at or before the de-
livery of the program. 
(d) [However, a]n affirmation or prediction merely of the value 
of the information, a display or description of a portion of the 
information to illustrate the aesthetics or market appeal [of in-
formational content], or a statement purporting to be merely the 
licensor's opinion or commendation of the information does not 
create a warranty ... . 5 
This-is not an implied warranty by any reasonable stretch of the imagi-
nation, and it may not even be a warranty at all. It essentially does no 
more than repeat, in diluted form, the substance of Article 2B's express 
warranty provision. 6 
5. U.C.C. § 2B-403(c), (d) (Draft, Feb. 1998). In that February Draft, the committee also 
considered an alternative formulation: 
(a) A merchant licensor of a computer program warrants to the end user that the computer 
program is reasonably fit for the ordinary purpose for which it is distributed. 
(b) A merchant licensor of a computer program warrants to a retailer that 
(I) the program is adequately packaged and labeled as the agreement or 
circumstances may require; and 
(2) in the case of multiple copies, that the copies are, within the variations permitted by 
the agreement, of even kind, quality, and quantity, within each unit and among all the units 
involved. 
(c) A warranty under this section does not pertain to the quality, aesthetics, market appeal, 
accuracy, or other characteristics of informational content whether or not the content is 
included within or created by a computer program or software. 
/d. § 2B-403 reporter's notes (emphasis added). Given this alternative's use of the "reasonably" 
modifier, it too departed substantially from the current Article 2 analogue. Hereinafter, all citations to 
Draft 2B are to the March 1998 version unless otherwise indicated. 
6. See U.C.C. § 2B-402 which provides: 
(a) Subject to subsection (c), express warranties by the licensor are created as follows: 
(I) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the licensor to its licensee in any 
manner, including in a medium for communication to the public such as advertising, which 
relates to the information and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express 
warranty that the information required under the agreement shall conform to the 
affirmation or promise. 
(2) Any description of the information which is made part of the basis of the bargain 
creates an express warranty that the information shall conform to the description. 
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It is worth noting who would and would not likely have been af-
fected by the flaw present in the February Draft's implied warranty of 
merchantability. It would not have had an impact on ordinary consum-
ers; consumer transactions were covered by the implied warranty of 
merchantability provided in subsection 2B-403(a), which governs 
"mass-market" transactions.7 And it is unlikely that large corporate 
licensees would have suffered under the February Draft of section 2B-
403, as they generally have the bargaining power to insist on substantial 
express warranties, governed by section 2B-402, to protect their inter-
ests. 
The most likely losers under the February Draft of section 2B-403, 
therefore, were small businesses that license, say, payroll or accounts 
receivable software not on the mass market. This is, to be sure, a niche 
market, but evidently a sufficiently significant niche to attract the atten-
tion of those who license software. 
Licensors were the clear winners under the February Draft of sec-
tion 2B-403; under its implied "warranty," their software did not need 
to be as good as the norm; it needed only to be the product of consci-
entious effort. The "requirement" that "the computer program will 
perform in substantial conformance with any promises or affirmations 
of fact contained in the documentation provided by the licensor,"8 the 
so-called "warranty of documentation," opened the door for licensors 
to limit the scope and substance of their liability in documentation ac-
companying their software. 
(3) Any sample, model, or demonstration of a fmal product which is made part of the 
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the performance of the information 
will reasonably conform to the performance illustrated by the model, sample, or 
demonstration, taking into account such differences between the sample, model, or 
demonstration and the information as it would be used as would appear to a reasonable 
person in the position of the licensee. 
(b) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the licensor use formal 
words such as "warranty" or "guarantee," or state a specific intention to make a warranty. 
However, an affirmation or prediction merely of the value of the information, a display or 
description of a portion of the information to illustrate the aesthetics or market appeal of 
informational content, or a statement purporting to be merely the licensor's opinion or 
commendation of the information does not create a warranty. 
(c) This section does not create an express warranty for published informational content. 
However, it does not preclude the creation of an express warranty under other law or the 
creation of an express contractual obligation for published informational content. If an 
express warranty or contractual obligation is established for published informational content 
and is breached, the remedies of the aggrieved party arise under this article. 
!d. (emphasis added). 
7. See U.C.C. § 2B-403(a) (Draft, Feb. 1998) ("Unless excluded or modified, a warranty that 
the computer program and physical medium shall be merchantable is implied in a mass-market 
transaction if the licensor is a merchant with respect to computer programs of that kind."). "Mass-
market license" refers to a standard form that is prepared for and used in a consumer transaction in 
information directed at the general public. See id. § 2B-1 02(30), (31 ). 
8. !d. § 2B-403(c)(2). 
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In the February Draft, the reporter explained that section 2B-403' s 
approach to the implied warranty of merchantability "is common in 
commercial licenses."9 Furthermore, rather than suggesting disingenu-
ously that there is something fundamentally different about software, 
the reporter asserted that the U.C.C. itself has not kept pace with the de-
velopment of commercial transactions. His candor is refreshing: 
Most agreements disclaim merchantability; there are few re-
ported commercial cases involving merchantability in any in-
dustry. Most licenses substitute a warranty of conformance to 
documentation. The section treats this as the presumed warranty, 
conforming to a commercial norm. This warranty measures per-
formance by reference to what is said about the particular prod-
uct. The argument in favor of retaining a merchantability 
warranty for transactions is that it would maintain a congruence 
between this Article and Article 2 and 2A. This may be ephem-
eral and could be reversed: those Articles should adapt to com-
mercial practice. Merchantability measures performance 
obligations by reference to other like products, while the docu-
mentation warranty measures performance by what the licensor 
says about its product.1o 
The warranty of documentation thus appeared in the February Draft. By 
including this provision, the Article 2B Drafting Committee had thrown 
down the gauntlet. Committees revising Articles 2 and 2A potentially 
would have to eliminate the warranty of merchantability, at least in 
transactions involving non-"mass-market" goods, if those Articles were 
to join the present state of the commercial world. 
At its March 1998 meeting,11 however, the Article 2B Drafting 
Committee apparently rethought its position on the inefficacy of an im-
plied warranty of merchantability in the context of non-mass-market 
software and returned to the Article 2 fold: 
(b) To be merchantable, a computer program and any physical 
medium on which it is delivered must: 
(l)pass without objection in the trade under the contract 
description; [and] 
(2)be fit for the ordinary purposes for which it is distrib-
utedP 
So Article 2B would now embrace the standard that the reporter just one 
month earlier had essentially described as impotent in the software li-
censing context. 
9. Id. § 2B-403 general note 4 (Draft, Feb. 1998). 
10. Id. § 2B-403 general note 5. 
11. The meeting was held in San Diego, California, March 27-29, 1998. 
12. U.C.C. § 2B-403(b). This version was passed by the Committee by a vote of 10-1. 
Telephone Interview with Stephen Y. Chow, Member of the Drafting Committee (Apr. 2, 1998). 
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The thesis urged here is that if the warranty of merchantability in 
the software licensing context is in fact inefficacious, ,then the courts will 
likely look elsewhere to find a meaningful quality standard. That is, if 
courts conclude that the reporter was right when he observed that the 2B 
merchantability warranty is meaningless without a mature transactional 
context within which to formulate conceptions of ordinary fitness, 
judges and juries will find other legal theories to protect disappointed 
software licensees. 
This Article endeavors to put Article 2B 's implied warranty of 
merchantability in context. Part I describes the state of warranty liability 
under current Article 2 of the U.C.C. to provide the foundation for an 
analysis of Article 2B's implied warranty of merchantability. Part II 
then considers how Article 2's warranty fits with the patchwork of tort-
based product liability theories developed by the courts. Part III ex-
plains how the products liability law could fill the void left by the 
absence of meaningful implied warranty of merchantability protection 
in Article 2B. It concludes that the application of strict products liability 
theories to deficient software is inevitable, and will only be more robust 
in the absence of meaningful warranty protection. 
I 
WARRANTY AND TORT RECOVERY IN THE COMMERCIAL LAW: 
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF CONTRACT AND TORT 
A. Current Sales Warranty Law Under Article 2 of the U.C.C. 
There are three warranty of quality provisions in current Article 2 
of the U.C.C.: the section 2-313 express warranty,13 the section 2-314 
implied warranty of merchantability,14 and the section 2-315 implied 
!d. 
13. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1995). The section provides: 
Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, Description, Sample. 
( 1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to 
the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the 
goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates 
an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description. 
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an 
express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the sample or model. 
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal 
words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a 
warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to 
be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. 
14. !d.§ 2-314. The section provides: 
Implied Warranty: Merchantability; Usage of Trade. 
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be 
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to 
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warranty of fitness for particular purpose.15 These formulations, alterna-
tive and overlapping,16 are products of their time.J? But because each is 
cast in sufficiently flexible language to fit evolving transactional pat-
terns, they have held up quite well since their drafting in the 19.50s. 
In part, this is a credit to the drafters. But the warranties' durability 
also suggests the centrality of warranty in commercial transactions. War-
ranties are fundamental to transactors' expectations, and they allocate 
risk in a manner that is consistent with transactional exigencies. Basi-
cally, warranties fix risk. 
This Part reviews the Article 2 warranties and compares them with 
analogous legal doctrines concerning implied quality representations. It 
examines the interaction of the Article 2 warranties with each other and 
with alternative implied quality assurance doctrines in order to provide 
perspective for appraisal of the Article 2B implied warranty of mer-
chantability. 
/d. 
/d. 
goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed 
either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale. 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as 
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; 
and 
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and 
quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and 
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; 
and 
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if 
any. 
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may arise from 
course of dealing or usage of trade. 
15. /d.§ 2-315. The section provides: 
Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose. 
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for 
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to 
select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section 
an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose. 
16. For demonstrations of how more than one of these provisions may apply to the same 
transaction, depending on the facts and circumstances surrounding the deal, see, e.g., Klein v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 773 F.2d 1421 (4th Cir. 1985); Custom Automated Mach. v. Penda Corp., 537 F. Supp. 
77 (N.D. TIL 1982); Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 653 S.W.2d 128 (Ark. 1983); 
Mennonite Deaconess Home & Hosp., Inc. v. Gates Eng'g Co., 363 N.W.2d 155 (Neb. 1985); 
Warren v. Joseph Harris Co., 313 S.E.2d 901 (N.C. Ct App. 1984); Gall v. Allegheny County Health 
Dep't, 555 A.2d 786 (Pa. 1989); see also WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
SERIES,§ 2-315:01, at 546-47 (1992) (noting overlap between sections 2-314 and 2-315 and the fact 
that a seller's statements may create warranties under both sections 2-313 and 2-315). 
17. See WILLIAM TwiNING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 311 (1973) 
("[Llewellyn] formulated [the Code] with reference to a particular problem which arose in a specific 
context at a particular moment in history.''). 
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As creatures of contract, warranties constitute representa-
tions: representations about the present, and representations about the 
future. 
The Article 2 express-warranty provision, section 2-313, provides 
that a seller who makes a representation about the quality of the goods 
sold will be held to that representation. The resulting warranty pertains 
both to affirmations concerning the present state of the goods (e.g., 
"This watch is made of gold"),18 and to promises regarding the goods' 
performance in the future (e.g., "This watch will keep accurate 
time").19 Section 2-313 also makes clear that the express-warranty rep-
resentation may arise from samples, models, and description of goods.20 
Finally, the terms of the bargain fix the scope of the express warranty: a 
representation is actionable as an express warranty only if it becomes 
"part of the basis of the bargain"21 between buyer and seller. Courts, 
however, have not made it very difficult for buyers to satisfy the "basis 
of the bargain" requirement.22 
The Article 2 implied warranty of merchantability, section 2-314, 
imposes liability on a seller for sales of non-"merchantable" goods. In 
effect, every sale of goods by a merchant23 seller entails an implied 
representation that the goods are "fit for the[ir] ordinary purpose[]."24 
18. See, e.g., Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 208 (Colo. 1984); Cricket Alley Corp. v. 
Data Terminal Sys., Inc., 732 P.2d 719, 722 (Kan. 1987); Yost v. Millhouse, 373 N.W.2d 826, 829 
(Minn. Ct App. 1985); Bernstein v. Shennan, 497 N.Y.S.2d 298, 300 (Just. Ct. 1986). 
19. See, e.g., Custom Automated Mach., 537 F. Supp. at 82-83; Krieger v. Nick Alexander 
Imports, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 717,724-25 (Ct. App. 1991); Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635, 644-45 
(Ind. Ct App. 1976); Boese-Hilburn Co. v. Dean Mach. Co., 616 S.W.2d 520, 529 (Mo. Ct App. 
1981). 
20. See U.C.C. § 2-313(l)(b), (c) (1995). 
21. !d. § 2-313(1). The term "bargain" is used as well in the Article I general definition of 
"agreement." !d. § 1-201(3). 
22. See, e.g., Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird, 432 So. 2d 1259 (Ala. 1983); Winston Indus., Inc. 
v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 317 So. 2d 493, 497 (Ala. Civ. App. 1975) ("the determining factor in this case 
under the newly enacted [U.C.C.] is not reliance by the purchaser on the seller's warranty, but 
whether it is part of the 'basis of the bargain"'); Hauter v. Zogarts, 534 P.2d 377, 384 (Cal. 1975) 
("the affirmation, once made, is a part of the agreement, and lack of reliance by the buyer is not a 
fact which would take the affirmation out of the agreement") (internal citation omitted); Carpetland 
U.S.A. v. Payne, 536 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Ind. Ct App. 1989) (holding buyer does not need to show 
reliance on seller's statement to prove assertion was part of the basis of the bargain). John Murray 
argues, not entirely convincingly, that the basis of the bargain requirement is distinguishable from a 
reliance test See John E. Murray, Jr., "Basis of the Bargain": Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 
MINN. L. REv. 283, 317-25 (1982). 
23. A "merchant" is a person who 
deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having 
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom 
such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other 
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill. 
u.c.c. § 2-104(1) (1995). 
24. !d. § 2-314(2)(c). Section 2-314(2) also contains alternative formulations of the 
merchantability standard requiring, for example, that fungible goods be of "fair average quality 
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Courts have construed this standard to recognize the buyer's under-
standing of "merchantability."25 
The Article 2 implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, 
section 2-315, is a hybrid of the express warranty and implied warranty 
of merchantability provisions. To be liable under the warranty of fitness, 
the seller must be aware that the buyer is relying on his expertise in se-
lecting goods that are suitable for the buyer's particular purpose. The 
representation that the goods are "fit" may be inferred from the cir-
cumstances surrounding the sale.26 
The three Article 2 warranties overlap27 to assure comprehensive 
coverage. But they are not monolithic; insofar as the warranties are 
creatures of contract, parties to sales transactions remain free to contract 
out of warranty protection, no matter how comprehensive the scope of 
the express and implied warranty provisions. 28 
Since the warranties are not identical, the means to disclaim each 
one effectively may not be the same in all instances. Consequently, 
courts may need to consider one type of warranty liability but not the 
other two because a disclaimer successfully insulates the seller from 
liability under only two of the three warranty provisions. In fact, cases 
considering the scope and interrelation of the three warranty sources 
often involve disclaimer.29 I discuss the importance of disclaimer 
below.30 
within the[ir] description" and that goods be "adequately contained, packaged, and labeled" 
according to any agreed-upon terms. Id. § 2-314(2)(b), (e). 
25. Price may be used as an indicator of the quality intended. See id. § 2-314 cmt. 7 ("The price 
at which a merchant closes a contract is an excellent index of the nature and scope of his 
obligation."); see also Dale v. King Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 676 P.2d 744, 748 (Kan. 1984) (implied 
warranty of merchantability varies with age, mileage, and purchase price of car); Faulkingham v. 
Seacoast Subaru, Inc., 577 A.2d 772, 774 (Me. 1990) (holding quality of used car determined by age, 
mileage, and purchase price); Sylvia Coal Co. v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 156 S.E.2d 1, 7 (W. Va. 
1967) (allowing jury to consider price when determining existence of implied warranty in connection 
with quality). 
26. See, e.g., Whitehouse v. Lange, 910 P.2d 801, 805-07 (Idaho Ct App. 1996); Rubin v. 
Marshall Field & Co., 597 N.E.2d 688, 691-92 (Ill. App. Ct 1992); Raupp v. Acor, 384 A.2d 968, 970 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1978). 
27. Arguably, the three warranties spring from the same fundamental source. In Randall v. 
Newson, the court captured the sum and substance of warranty law when it observed that "the 
fundamental undertaking [of the seller] is, that the article offered or delivered shall answer the 
description of it contained in the contract." 2 Q.B.D. 102, 109 (C.A. 1877). 
28. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1995). 
29. See, e.g., Auto-Teria, Inc. v. Ahem, 352 N.E.2d 774 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Collins Radio Co. 
v. Bell, 623 P.2d 1039 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980). 
30. See discussion infra Part II.A.l. 
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B. Complementary Sources of Seller Liability for Deficient Goods: 
"Fraud Unravels Everything"31 
The U.C.C.'s remedial provisions do not exist in a vacuum. The 
buyer of deficient goods, even goods obtained through transactions 
within the scope of Article 2, is not limited to the Code when seeking to 
recover against the seller. He may look as well to complementary legal 
principles or bodies of law to fill gaps left open by the Code. This 
Section considers those complementary sources. 
Section 1-103 of the U.C.C.32 recognizes that even a comprehensive 
and preemptive codification33 cannot respond to all needs of commer-
cial transactors, and that there is room for operation of supplementary 
common law and statutory rules that cooperate with the U.C.C. to assure 
the parties the benefit of their bargain. Parties may, therefore, have re-
course to a complementary principle if a court finds that it has not been 
"displaced" by Article 2. It is in such crevices of the statutory regime 
that common law fraud principles have taken root. 
For instance, when a seller makes an inaccurate representation 
during sales-contract negotiations, that representation may later support 
a tort-based misrepresentation action by the buyer. If the seller's mis-
representation is intentional, the seller will be liable for fraud and, if the 
.jurisdiction allows, vulnerable to exemplary damages. 34 
But a misrepresentation need not be intentional for the buyer to 
recover. Section 402B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes 
the viability of innocent misrepresentation actions against sellers.35 
31. JOHN M. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 288 (1980). 
32. 
Supplementary General Principles of Law Applicable. Unless displaced by the particular 
provisions of this Act, the principles oflaw and equity, including the law merchant and the 
law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, 
duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall 
supplement its provisions. 
u.c.c. § 1-103 (1995). 
33. See William D. Hawkland, Unifonn Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. LF. 
291, 309-13 (1962), for comprehensive treatment of what it means for the U.C.C. to be construed as a 
"code." 
34. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522A (1964); see also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559,577-78 (1996) (ruling that failure to disclose a pre-sale repair to plaintiffs car 
constituted fraud and raised possibility of punitive damages); Briggs Transp. Co. v. Starr Sales Co., 
262 N.W.2d 805, 811 (Iowa 1978) (holding that trial court was justified in rendering judgment for 
punitive damages for the fraudulent breach of a contract for the sale of electronics equipment); 
Saberton v. Greenwald, 66 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ohio 1946) (allowing punitive damages for fraudulent 
sale of reconditioned watch as a new watch). 
35. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1964). Section 402B provides: 
Misrepresentation by Seller of Chattels to Consumer. 
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels, or otherwise, 
makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the character or 
quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of the 
chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though 
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Similarly, section 9 of the recently promulgated Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability36 recognizes the "Liability of Commercial 
Product Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused by Misrepresentation." 
Section 9 provides: "One engaged in the business of selling or other-
wise distributiug products, who in connection with the sale of a product, 
makes a fraudulent, negligent, or innocent misrepresentation concerning 
the product, is subject to liability for harm to persons or property 
caused by the misrepresentation. "37 
In fact, section 9 may impose liability in more cases than would 
original section 402B, which required that the representation be made 
"by advertising, labels, or otherwise ... to the public."38 The reporters 
of the products liability Restatement acknowledge that the extent of a 
seller's liability for innocent misrepresentations to individuals other 
than through advertising to "the public at large" is an open question, 
even under the section 9 formulation. Consequently, the developer of 
custom-designed computer software would seem to have more reason to 
be concerned by section 9 than by section 402B, the terms of which 
contemplate more distinctly public representations than does section 9. 
Importantly, the products liability Restatement reporter's note that 
section 9 liability represents an alternative theory to a seller's liability 
under U.C.C. section 2-313.39 Consequently, a court could find that the 
seller did not make a warranty, express or otherwise, but still did make 
the type of representation that would support an action under section 9. 
Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp.40 illustrates the inter 
action of the U.C.C. warranties and the common law doctrine of 
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and 
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any contractual relation 
with the seller. 
ld.; see also Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151-52 (Cal. 1965) (en bane) (stating that under 
402B, liability can be imposed without a finding of negligence where the manufacturer of a product 
has made representations that the product is free from defects in material and workmanship, even 
though there is no privity of contract); Klages v. General Ordinance Equip. Corp., 367 A.2d 304, 311 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (allowing a fmding of liability for failure of a mace pen to "effect[] an 
instantaneous, immediate, and complete incapacitation of an assailant" as represented); Godwin 
Aircraft, Inc. v. Houston, 851 S.W.2d 816, 822 (Tenn. Ct App. 1992) (finding liability for negligent 
misrepresentation regarding airplane' s condition at the time of sale); Crocker v. Winthrop Labs., 514 
S.W.2d 429,433 (Tex. 1974) (holding that where drug was represented to be free from all dangers of 
addiction and treating physician relied on the representation, the drug company was liable when 
representations proved false and decedent's death resulted). 
36. I discuss the Products Liability Restatement in more detail, infra Part ill. 
37. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 9 (Proposed Final Draft, Apr. 
I , 1997). 
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1964). 
39. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 9 cmt. e (1997) ("The rule 
stated in this Section provides a remedy in tort in many cases in which a remedy for breach of 
express warranty is also available to the plaintiff."). 
40. 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971). 
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misrepresentation in the context of computer software. Service Bureau 
Corporation (SBC) provided inadequate data processing services to the 
plaintiff.41 SBC relied on the lack of express warranties and the dis-
claimer of all implied warranties in its contracts with plaintiff to success-
fully resist breach of warranty liability.42 But plaintiff had also 
proceeded on an innocent misrepresentation theory, alleging that SBC 
had represented "that the proposed data processing system would, when 
fully implemented, be capable of providing [plaintiff] sufficient infor-
mation in a form such that when properly utilized, it would constitute an 
effective and efficient tool to be used in inventory control."43 The lower 
court found that SBC's representation was innocent, but that it still con-
stituted actionable fraud. 
On appeal, defendant argued that warranty law preempted the 
innocent misrepresentation theory, because "[u]nder the relevant law, 
innocent misrepresentation and warranties, either express or implied, are 
substantially similar in nature."44 The U.C.C. was not the applicable law 
at the time of the transaction, but the defendant relied on the legisla-
ture's subsequent passage of the U.C.C. to argue that the legislature in-
tended for statutory warranty law to preempt the operation of common 
law innocent misrepresentation theories in sales transactions. 45 
The Eighth Circuit found that scienter, or intent to defraud, was not 
required to sustain a fraud action in the state.46 Moreover, the court 
41. SBC was to provide inventory reports containing a detailed history for each item, a 
movement history during specified months, on-hand figures, and a computation of the number of 
weeks' supply of each item delivered on hand. These reports were to be delivered in January of 
1966, but due to a programming error by SBC, they were not received until July of 1966. Further, the 
input method SBC employed was slow and expensive, and the reports were error-ridden. See id. at 
173-75. 
42. See id. at 176. 
43. Id. at 175. The lower court found that SBC had made other specific actionable 
misrepresentations to plaintiff, specifically that 
1. automating the firm's accounting was the only way the plaintiff could have an 
inventory control system; 
2. adequate controls were installed in the system to prevent errors and keep them to a 
miaimum; 
3. Friden Flexowriters were suitable devices to input data into the system, that eight 
Flexowriters were sufficient, that clerical personnel could operate the Flexowriters, and 
that the Flexowriters would create a hard copy of the invoice for the customer's order; 
4. weekly sales management reports would allow management by exception. 
See id. 
44. Id. at 180. The Uniform Sales Act had been the basis of the existing commercial law in 
Minnesota since 1917. See 1917 Minn. Laws 465. 
45. See Clements Auto Co., 444 F.2d at 179-80. 
46. See id. at 176. The elements of a misrepresentation action in Minnesota are as follows: 
1. There must be a representation; 2. That representation must be false; 3. It must have to do 
with a past or present fact; 4. That fact must be material; 5. It must be susceptible of 
knowledge; 6. The representor must know it to be false, or in the alternative, must assert it 
as of his own knowledge without knowing whether it is true or false; 7. The representor 
must intend to have the other person induced to act, or justified in acting upon it; 8. That 
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dismissed the defendant's preemption argument by relying on a prior 
state court holding that "a general disclaimer clause is ineffective to 
negate reliance on even innocent misrepresentations .... There is no 
indication that the disclaimer of warranty negates reliance on false 
representations made with or without intent to deceive."47 Finally, the 
court noted that the passage of the U.C.C. did not affect its conclusion.48 
This holding is in perfect keeping with the language of U.C.C. section 
1-103 which accommodates, rather than frustrates, the operation of an 
innocent misrepresentation theory. 
The Clements analysis would seem pertinent, and perhaps even 
more appropriate, in states where warranty law provides buyers, lessees, 
or licensees less protection than does misrepresentation law, particularly 
innocent misrepresentation law. And if that is the case, could an Article 
2B that essentially abrogates implied warranty liability in favor of ex-
press warranty truly accomplish uniformity? 
In a thoughtful article, JoEllen Mitchell-Lockyer treats the uneasy 
fit between the Code and supplementary misrepresentation theories.49 
She argues, 
Modem torts for unintentional seller misrepresentation are 
displaced by Article II on sales in a number of different ways. 
First, such alternate tort liability can conflict with particular 
Article II provisions, most notably the parol evidence rule, the 
disclaimer and limitations sections, the seller's right to cure, and 
the substantive and procedural requirements for rejection and 
revocation of acceptance. Moreover, the Article II sales provi-
sions include novel approaches to warranty, breach, damages, 
and cancellation, among others, that would be frustrated by these 
tort actions. Though, for example, the sales provisions are 
'silent' on the contract affirmative defenses, use of innocent 
person must be so induced to act or so justified in acting; 9. That person's action must be in 
reliance upon the representation; 10. That person must suffer damage; II. That damage 
must be attributable to the misrepresentation, that is, the statement must be the proximate 
cause of the injury. 
/d. at 175 (citing Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 1960)). The court also 
emphasized the Minnesota Supreme Court's statement in Swanson v. Damning, 86 N.W.2d 716, 720-
21 (Minn. 1957), to the effect that 
[a]n intent to deceive no longer is necessary. Nor is it necessary to prove that defendants 
knew the representations were false. It is not necessary that the statement be recklessly or 
carelessly made. It makes no difference how it is made if it is made as an affirmation of 
which defendant has knowledge and it is in fact untrue. The right of recovery in a case of 
this kind is based on the fact that such statement, being untrue in fact, relied upon by the 
other party in entering into the transaction, has resulted in the loss to him which he should 
not be required to bear. 
Clements Auto Co., 444 F.2d at 176 (internal citation and quotation omitted). 
47. /d. at 178-79 (citations omitted). 
48. See id. at 180. 
49. JoEllen Mitchell-Lockyer, Common Law Misrepresentation in Sales Cases-An Argument 
for Code Dominance, 19 FoRUM 361 (1984). 
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misrepresentation as a ground for such a defense can hamper the 
operation of numerous Article IT provisions relating to the scope 
of the bargain. Finally, though Article II does not contain a 
body of specialized provisions relating solely to fraud and mis-
representation, section 2-721 preempts conflicting common law 
requiring election of remedies for fraud and misrepresentation 
in goods transactions.so 
I do not take issue with Mitchell-Lockyer's conclusion that the aggres-
sive use of complementary misrepresentation theories undermines the 
balance struck by the uniform commercial law. In fact, I am sure that 
she is right. But her arguments for Code dominance are premised on the 
Code's preemption of a body of law. Once the commercial law becomes 
a means of insulating licensors from liability for the deficiencies in their 
products at the expense of licensees, courts may find the preemption 
argument less tenable. In that context it will be easier for disappointed 
contracting parties to argue that the Code does not adequately provide 
the fundamental safeguards that are the basis of warranty law.51 And 
Article 2B appears to establish just such a context. 
n 
A COMMERCIAL WORLD WITHOUT IMPLIED WARRANTY 
A further review of the current Article 2 law provides a frame of 
reference to guide critique of Article 2B's implied warranty of mer-
chantability in non-mass-market licenses. It also helps illuminate how 
the law might respond to a commercial world without real implied-
warranty protections. 
A. Courts Expanding Liability Beyond Warranty Using 
Strict Products Liability Theory 
The warranty provisions of Article 2 of the U.C.C. were drafted at a 
dramatic time in the evolution of our commercial economy-a time 
when the fit between warranty and complementary theories supporting 
recovery for goods that failed was edgy at best.52 Unsurprisingly, those 
50. /d. at 375-76 (footnotes omitted). 
51. See Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, Commercial Codification as Negotiation, 32 U.C. DAVIS 
L REv. (forthcoming Jan. 1999) (manuscript at 45-48, on file with author) (discussing Randall v. 
Newson, 2 Q.B.D. 102 (C.A. 1877)). 
52. See Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE LJ. 1341 
(1948). Gilmore writes, 
In the present post-war period, following ten years of unprecedented expansion of the 
national productive capacity, industrial and commercial practices are fluid and subject to 
sudden change. 
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interested in striking a balance between the rights of buyers and sellers 
looked elsewhere when conceptions of consent did not sufficiently ex-
plain transactions. This especially happens when a party's "consent" to 
a contract is more fiction than reality. Consequently, even contract 
remedies manifest elements of tort. 
To be sure, the prominence of tort varies among the three warran-
ties. Express warranties are founded in contract. But even here, to the 
extent that buyer expectations may determine the "basis of the bar-
gain,"53 the operation of objective tort principles is visible. 
The implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, too, seems 
primarily a creature of contract, at least insofar as it contemplates 
something akin to a meeting of the minds, that is, the seller's reason to 
know that the buyer is relying on the seller's expertise. But a more 
objective, tort-like judgment surfaces in the particular purpose warranty 
as well through the determination of whether goods are, in fact, "fit" 
for a particular purpose. 
The implied warranty of merchantability, however, is most clearly 
the product of tort. Sellers breach the warranty if their goods are not 
"fit for the[ir] ordinary purpose[],"54 or will not "pass without objec-
tion in the trade. "55 The cases confirm that those determinations pro-
ceed from an objective, reasonableness perspective.56 So understood, the 
It is easy to predict that as air freight gropes its way out of its experimental stage, new legal 
patterns for controlling and financing goods in transit will develop; it is less easy to say what 
the new patterns will be. 
Industrial finance, particularly in the acquisition of short term working capital, has greatly 
changed during the past ten years; it is difficult to say whether the change was a temporary 
war-production phenomenon or the beginning of a permanent shift in our financing habits. 
It is entirely possible that our distribution system is also undergoing significant change. 
Cooperative associations of producers, retailers, and to a lesser extent of consumers, are 
increasingly cutting the middleman's profit from the cost of marketing. National and 
regional mail order houses and chain stores have the same effect The integrated operation, 
with centralized control which may extend from the extraction of raw materials to the retail 
distribution of finished products, may become typical of the next stage of industrial 
organization .... [I]ncrease in the range and complexity of goods and services put on the 
market will undoubtedly lead to far-reaching changes in our thinking about sellers' 
obligations .... 
ld. at 1356-58; see also TwiNING, supra note 17, at 305 ("[T]he Code was drafted in the expectation 
that it would probably have to last without major alterations for a substantial period ... with the 
prospect of an increasing momentum in the rate of technical and other change."). 
53. U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (1995). The use of an objective standard is suggested by the question 
proposed in comment 8: "What statements of the seller have in the circumstances and in objective 
judgment become part of the basis of the bargain?" ld. § 2-313 cmt 8. Murray proposes that the 
courts use a reasonable expectations test for determining the basis of the bargain. See Murray, supra 
note 22, at 317-18. 
54. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (1995). 
55. Id. § 2-314(2)(a). 
56. See, e.g., Greene v. Boddie-Noell Enters., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 416, 419 (W.D. Va. 1997) 
(noting that "it is the lawyer's challenging job to define the term 'merchantability' in [the] case in 
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implied warranty of merchantability affords courts the means to police 
the bargain by reference to the transactional context, including the rela-
tive sophistication and bargaining power of the parties. And once courts 
find a license in the implied warranty law, they are, arguably, less likely 
to look for it elsewhere in terms that would frustrate the consistent ap-
plication of commercial contracting principles. That is, once the implied 
warranty of merchantability is appreciated as responding to the interests 
vindicated by tort law, ostensibly complementary but essentially contra-
dictory recovery theories will not frustrate transactor expectations. 
Nevertheless, a contract element still exists in the implied warranty 
of merchantability: the warranty's substance in the particular case is to 
be determined by reference to the deal between the buyer and seller, the 
goods described, and the set price.57 As such, like the other two warran-
ties, it remains subject to the incidents of contract, including, impor-
tantly, disclaimer. This vulnerability to the incidents of contract is why 
warranties, express or implied, have heretofore been considered insuffi-
cient means to redress the compromised interest that may result when a 
buyer's quality expectations are frustrated. 
1. The Disclaimer Example 
All three of the U.C.C. Article 2 warranty provisions are subject to 
section 2-316's disclaimer provision.58 While the express warranty can 
some objective way so that the court or jury can make a determination whether that standard has 
been breached") (emphasis added) (quoting JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§ 9.7, at 356 (2d ed. I980)). 
57. See U.C.C. § 2-3I4 cmt. I (I995) (''The question when the warranty is imposed turns 
basically on the meaning of the terms of the agreement as recognized in the trade."); id. § 2-3 I 4 cmt. 
7 ("In cases of doubts as to what quality is intended, the price at which a merchant closes a contract 
is an excellent index of the nature and scope of his obligation under the present section."). 
58. See id. § 2-3I6. Section 2-3I6 provides: 
Exclusion or Modification of Warranties. 
(I) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or 
conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as 
consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic 
evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such 
construction is unreasonable. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability 
or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be 
conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must 
be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is 
sufficient if it states, for example, that ''There are no warranties which extend beyond the 
description on the face hereof." 
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) 
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded 
by expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or other language which in common 
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that 
there is no implied warranty; and 
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the 
sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no 
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not so much be "disclaimed" as refuted,59 the seller may avoid the im-
plied warranties of merchantability and fitness for particular purpose by 
invoking the right verbal formula. 60 
The availability of disclaimer in transactions between parties of 
unequal bargaining power helped motivate development of strict prod-
ucts liability law. Recall that in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 61 the 
New Jersey Supreme Court considered an automobile sales contract dis-
claiming all express and implied warranties other than the manufac-
turer's limited ninety-day or 4,000 mile warranty.62 The warranty 
was a standard form prepared by the Automobile Manufacturers 
Association-a form, the court concluded, that "has metamorphosed 
I d. 
implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to 
have revealed to him; and 
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealing or 
course of performance or usage of trade. 
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the provisions of 
this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and on contractual modification of 
remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719). 
59. A seller may be able to invoke the parol evidence rule, codified at U.C.C. section 2-202, to 
argue that an oral representation did not become part of his fmal agreement with a buyer. When a 
fmal agreement is in writing, however, two restrictions limit a seller's protection through a written 
disclaimer and section 2-202: (1) the written agreement must be "intended by the parties as a final 
expression of their agreement," id.; and (2) the parties must have intended that the writing contain the 
"complete and exclusive" terms of their agreement, id. § 2-202(b). See 1 JAMES J. WHITE & RoBERT 
S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11-2, at 586 (4th ed. 1995); see also Investors 
Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39 (D.S.C. 1974); Green Chevrolet Co. v. Kemp, 406 
S.W.2d 142 (Ark. 1966). 
60. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2), (3)(a); see also id. § 2-316 cmt. 7 ("Paragraph (a) of subsection {3) 
deals with general terms such as 'as is,' 'as they stand,' 'with all faults,' and the like. Such terms in 
ordinary commercial usage are understood to mean that the buyer takes the entire risk as to the 
quality of the goods involved."). 
61. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
62. See id. at 74. The reverse side of the contract contained 8 1/2 inches of fine print, titled 
"Conditions." The seventh paragraph, two-thirds of the way down the page, described the warranty: 
7. It is expressly agreed that there are no warranties, express or implied, made by either 
the dealer or the manufacturer on the motor vehicle, chassis, of [sic] parts furnished 
hereunder except as follows. 
The manufacturer warrants each new motor vehicle (including original equipment placed 
thereon by the manufacturer except tires), chassis or parts manufactured by it to be free 
from defects in material or workmanship under normal use and service. Its obligation under 
this warranty being limited to making good at its factory any part or parts thereof which 
shall, within ninety (90) days after delivery of such vehicle to the original purchaser or 
before such vehicle has been driven 4,000 miles, whichever event shall first occur, be 
returned to it with transportation charges prepaid and which its examination shall disclose to 
its satisfaction to have been thus defeetive; this warranty being expressly in lieu of all other 
warranties expressed or implied, and all other obligations or liabilities on its part, and it 
neither assumes nor authorizes any other person to assume for it any other liability in 
connection with the sale of its vehicles. 
ld. at 74 (quoting sales contract) (emphasis in original). 
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the warranty into a device to limit the maker's liability."63 The court did 
not mince words: 
[W]arranties originated in the law to safeguard the buyer 
and not to limit the liability of the seller or manufacturer. It 
seems obvious in this instance that the motive was to avoid the 
warranty obligations which are normally incidental to such sales. 
The language gave little and withdrew much. In return for the 
delusive remedy of replacement of defective parts at the factory, 
the buyer is said to have accepted the exclusion of the maker's 
liability for personal injuries arising from the breach of the war-
ranty, and to have agreed to the elimination of any other express 
or implied warranty. An instinctively felt sense of justice cries 
out against such a sharp bargain. 64 
The court thus invalidated the disclaimer of the implied warranty of 
merchantability as "inimical to the public good."65 
Clearly, Henningsen was a seminal strict products liability case. It 
effectively limited the operation of contract principles in what the court 
determined to be a not-entirely-consensual transaction.66 To be fair, 
Henningsen was a pre-U.C.C. case arising under the Uniform Sales Act. 
But while the U.C.C. Article 2 warranties respond in part to the warranty 
and disclaimer deficiencies at issue in Henningsen, the case nonetheless 
remains significant to warranty law both for its views of the "bargain," 
and for its demonstration that the contract limitations of warranty were 
an important factor in the development of the strict products liability 
law. 
2. The Privity Example 
Henningsen also examined contract law privity doctrine. Chrysler, 
the manufacturer-defendant, argued that because its contractual con-
nection was with Bloomfield Motors, and not with Henningsen, there was 
no basis upon which to impose warranty liability on Chrysler. The court 
showed little patience for this defense: 
63. !d. at 78. 
64. !d. at 85. 
65. !d. at 95. 
66. Other courts have struck down warranty disclaimers on similar public policy grounds. See, 
e.g., Woodruffv. Clark County Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 286 N.E.2d 188, 196 (Ind. App. a. 1972) 
(holding warranty disclaimers disfavored and strictly construed against sellers for public policy 
reasons); Loomis v. Stu Maguire's Equip. Sales, Inc., 511 N.Y.S.2d 439, 441 (Sup. a. App. Div. 
1987) (holding warranty disclaimer provision in contract for sale of used truck void as against public 
policy); Bernstein v. Sherman, 497 N.Y.S.2d 298, 301 (Just a. 1986) (concluding warranty 
disclaimer as to condition of auto frame would be invalid as against public policy); Durham v. Ciba-
Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d 696, 701 (S.D. 1982) (holding herbicide manufacturer's warranty 
disclaimer invalid as unconscionable and contrary to public purpose); Stauffer Chern. Co. v. Curry, 
778 P.2d 1083, 1091 (Wyo. 1989) (holding warranty disclaimers are not favored and are strictly 
interpreted for public policy reasons). 
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The limitations of privity in contracts for the sale of goods de-
veloped their place in the law when marketing conditions were 
simple, when maker and buyer frequently met face to face on an 
equal bargail).ing plane and when many of the products were 
relatively uncomplicated and conducive to inspection by a buyer 
competent to evaluate their quality.67 
289 
Though Henningsen construed pre-U.C.C. warranty law, Article 2 
does not offer a comprehensive response to the privity issues that war-
ranty cases raise. First, there is little indication that Article 2 as enacted 
says anything about vertical privity.68 Second, section 2-318's three al-
tematives69 determine the cases in which there is sufficient privity, but 
may not provide exhaustive treatment of even the horizontal warranty 
issue.70 
In Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co.,71 the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania addressed a horizontal privity question within the scope of 
section 2-318. The court began by noting its earlier abrogation of the 
vertical privity requirement.72 Hence, although Pennsylvania had 
67. Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 80. 
68. See Alces & Frisch, supra note 51, at 55-60. But see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 59, § 
11-2, at 586 (stating that Alternatives Band C of section 2-318 and "various nonstandard versions of 
2-318" affect both horizontal and verticiu privity). 
69. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (amended 1966), which provides: 
Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied. 
Alternative A 
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the 
family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect 
that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person 
by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section. 
Alternative B 
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who may 
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in 
person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this 
section. 
Alternative C 
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may reasonably 
be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of 
the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section with respect to 
injury to the person of an individual to whom the warranty extends. 
70. See id. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (stating that Alternative A "is not intended to enlarge or restrict the 
developing case law," that Alternative B "is designed for states where the case law has already 
developed further and for those that desire to expand the class of beneficiaries," and that Alternative 
C follows "the trend of modem decisions"). 
71. 319 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1974). 
72. See id. at 904 (citing Kassab v. Central Soya, 246 A.2d 848 (Pa. 1968)). "Privity of contract 
is that connection or relationship which exists between two or more contracting parties." BLACK's 
LAW DICTIONARY 1079 (5th ed. 1979); see also 4 ARTHUR L CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 778 (1951); 8 
SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 998A (3d ed. 1964). If a purchaser is injured by a defective 
product he may, of course, bring a breach of warranty claim against the seller. As contracting parties 
they are in privity. If the injured purchaser wishes to sue the manufacturer or wholesaler he must 
satisfy or overcome the vertical privity requirement. Because his contractual relationship is only with 
the retail seller, he cannot establish vertical privity with the wholesaler; he is one step further 
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adopted the most restrictive 2-318 form, Alternative A,73 the court found 
that the state's adoption of the strict products liability theory embodied 
in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts74 essentially neu-
tralized the Article 2 privity requirements: 
[A] manufacturer by virtue of Section 402A is effectively the 
guarantor of his products' safety .... Our courts have deter-
mined that a manufacturer by marketing and advertising his 
product impliedly represents that it is safe for its intended use. 
We have decided that no current societal interest is served by 
permitting the manufacturer to place a defective article in the 
stream of commerce and then to avoid responsibility for dam-
ages caused by the defect.75 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thus recognized the fundamental af-
fmity between the interests vindicated by the complementary warranty 
and strict products liability theories and disregarded privity require-
ments of warranty in order to achieve symmetry between buyer and 
seller in the law governing the quality of products. 
3. Common Sense: How Courts Will Respond to the Weakness of 
Article 2B Warranty by Borrowing from Strict Products Liability 
Just as law and equity have merged,76 the parallel development of 
Article 2 of the U.C.C. and strict products liability theory has effected a 
merger of tort and contract principles in the defective products law. 
Though the limitations of warranty theory were at first among the 
removed from the manufacturer. The question of vertical privity is: who can be sued? The question 
of horizontal privity is: who can sue? The purchaser can sue the retail seller because they are in 
privity. When the vertical privity requirement is abolished, a plaintiff may also sue any other entity in 
the distributive chain. But if the purchaser's wife is injured by a defeetive product, may she maintain 
a breach of warranty action? See U.C.C. § 2-318. May the purchaser's injured employee sue 
suceessfully? If a bystander is injured is he too entitled to recover for breach of warranty? These are 
questions of horizontal privity. See id. § 2-318 cmt. 1. 
/d. 
73. See supra note 69. 
74. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A provides: 
The Special Liability of Seller of Produet for Physical Harm to User or Consumer. 
(1) One who sells any product in a defeetive condition unreasonably dangerous to the user 
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the 
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in 
the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subseetion (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, 
and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any 
contractual relation with the seller. 
75. Salvador, 319 A.2d at 907. 
76. See FED. R CJv. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as 'eivil action'.''). 
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reasons for development of strict liability theory, cases like Salvador 
reveal that the expansion of strict products liability has now, in a curious 
symbiosis, itself redefmed the contours of warranty. 
The interaction between warranty and strict products liability sug-
gests that the two theories can no longer develop wholly independently. 
As demonstrated by cases such as Salvador and Kassab, expansion of 
one may encourage expansion of the other; warranty liability expands 
once strict products liability breaks through barriers such as the privity 
requirements at issue in those two cases. Most importantly for our pur-
poses, however, we must remain aware that it was warranty law's limita-
tions that engendered development of strict products liability. Once we 
appreciate how strict products liability law complements warranty law, 
we may expect that legislation limiting warranty liability in settings 
where warranty is important will only encourage the application of strict 
products liability to fill those gaps once more. Conversely, if we want to 
avoid this phenomenon, we must look to a strengthened warranty law to 
provide a solid jurisprudential basis for preventing the strict products 
liability response. 
To discern the extent of the jurisprudential tension between war-
ranty and strict products liability, it is worthwhile to consider the sources 
of some fundamental commercial law conceptions. 
B. The Unpeaceful Coexistence of Diametrically Opposed Errors: 
Excess in the Service of Politics 
1. Politics in the Drafting of U.C.C. Articles 2, 3, 4, and 9 
Times were easier for the drafters of uniform commercial law when 
they promulgated current Article 2. The sales law at the time applied 
contract principles to recurring transactions among relatively sophisti-
cated transactors. From the drafting perspective, Article 2 was bilateral 
legislation, in that it did not favor one party's interests over the other. 
Large institutional sellers such as the Ford Motor Company or Sears 
were as often buyers as they were sellers, and these large institutional 
interests would not have been served by legislation that favored either 
buyers or sellers as a class.77 The drafters, therefore, had a real interest in 
enacting legislation that would provide certain, predictable results, rather 
than legislation that would accommodate one business interest at the 
expense of another.78 
77. In general, Article 2 does not offer significant consumer protections. Rather, specific 
consumer protection laws supplement the Code and common law. See MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, 
CONSUMER LAW: A GUIDE FOR THOSE WHO REPRESENT SELLERS, LENDERS, AND CONSUMERS 1-6 
(1995) (tracing the development of consumer protection legislation in the twentieth century). 
78. See U.C.C. § 1-102; TwiNING, supra note 17, at 290-91,303-04. 
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The importance of these institutional entiti~s' positions should not 
be underestimated. Witness Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C., which many 
have noted were essentially controlled by dominant financial interests in 
both their original and revised iterations.79 U.C.C. Article 2A also dis-
plays the influence of institutional politics, and provides yet another 
perspective for assessment of Article 2B. Article 2A, governing leases of 
personal property, was based on the Article 2 model, as though the rela-
tionship between lessors and lessees was as essentially congruent as that 
between repeat buyers and sellers. Of course, Hertz the lessor is rarely 
Hertz the lessee. So it may not be immediately clear why the drafters of 
Article 2A seemed to have followed the Article 2 rather than the Article 
9 model. In operation, however, Article 2A is a hybrid, drawing upon 
sales principles when appropriate (e.g., warranties)80 and drawing on se-
cured transactions principles when appropriate (e.g. lessor's right to 
recover lease property upon lessee's default).81 
2. The Modern Revisions 
The most recent U.C.C. revision initiatives have readjusted the neat 
unilateral/bilateral dichotomy posited above. Additional interest groups 
have made more of a contribution to the structure of the current for-
mulations than was manifest in the original versions of Article 2, Article 
2A, and Article 9. Advocates of enhanced consumer protection have 
participated actively in the Article 2 and Article 9 revision efforts, intro-
ducing to those commercial contexts consumer protections imported 
79. During the original drafting process of Article 4, Professor Beutel, not a supporter of the 
U.C.C. project, argued, "In fact, this Article [Article 4] is so one-sidedly drawn in favor of the 
banking interests that any banker who insisted on exercising the rights given him by this 'Code' would 
probably be under suspicion by the better business bureau." Beutel, supra note 1, at 362. Professor 
Gilmore, a drafter of Article 9 and a general supporter of Article 4, also could not disagree 
completely with Beutel's assessment. An "efficient collection system is in the private interest of banks 
as much as it is in the public interest of customers of banks .... Section 4-103 goes far beyond what 
is wise or permissible in allowing banks to rewrite the law their way whenever things get tough .... " 
Grant Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 376-
77 (1952). Despite the rise of the American consumer movement in the years subsequent to the 
adoption of Article 4, the revision of Articles 3 and 4 changed little from the consumer's standpoint. 
See Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L REv. 
551, 586-92 (1991) (describing how pressure from financial institutions during the drafting process 
skewed the balance among the rights of parties to negotiable instruments transactions within the scope 
of revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code). 
80. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2A-210 (express warranties), 2A-212 (implied warranty of 
merchantability), 2A-213 (implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose) (1995). The official 
comments note that these code seetions were revised to reflect that cases extended Article 2 
warranties to lease transactions. See id. § 2A-212 cmt. (citing Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey 
Constr., Inc., 541 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Idaho 1975)); id. § 2A-213 cmt. (citing All-States Leasing Co. v. 
Bass, 538 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Idaho 1975)). 
81. See id. §§ 2A-525, 9-503 (1995). "Subsection [2A-525] (2), a revised version of the 
provisions of Section 9-503, allows the lessor, on a Section 2A-524(1) or 2A-523(3)(a) default by the 
lessee, the right to take possession of or reclaim the goods." !d. § 2A-525 cmt. 2. 
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from common law tort principles and from state and federal regulatory 
regimes. The involvement of these groups reflects a maturation in the 
structure of commerce to a point where non-institutional buyers now 
have discrete interests that challenge the bilateral model. The result, par-
ticularly in the case of the draft revision of Article 2, is a contracts stat-
ute which, in many cases, does not rely upon conceptions of consent so 
much as it does on the law of less than consensual relations. 82 Draft 
Revised Article 9, too, includes extensive provision of individual con-
sumer rights and would effect a sea change in secured-transactions law, 
as least insofar as it relates to consumer financing. 
At this point, the revision of Article 2A is on hold pending devel-
opments in the revision of Article 2 and the promulgation of an Article 
2B. It may be difficult, however, for the drafters of an Article 2A 
Revision to discern sufficient commonality between Revised Article 2 
and Proposed Article 2B to know which course to follow. Draft Revised 
Article 2 and Proposed Article 2B proceed from diametrically opposed 
frames of reference. Draft Revised Article 2 vindicates consumer 
(buyer) interests at the expense of large institutional sellers (as well as 
small, not-so-institutional sellers). Article 2B, on the other hand, would 
make the world safe(r) for computer software developers and licensors 
(the parties analogous to Article 2 sellers). 
This incoherence between the two nascent bodies of commercial 
law is perhaps nowhere more manifest, and regrettable, than in the war-
ranty provisions formulated in the two drafts. Draft Revised Article 2 
affords buyers enhanced warranty protection in relation to current 
Article 2. The drafters of Proposed Article 2B, on the other hand, be-
lieve that software licensing law essentially cannot provide implied war-
ranty of merchantability protection in the case of non-mass-market 
software. Unless some sound reason can be discerned for this differ-
ence-some reason independent of the market or political power of the 
concerned constituencies-then the fundamental coherence that has 
been the object of Article 2 and Article 2-like law will be fatally com-
promised. And, of course, software licensees will suffer. In the next 
Section, I examine the Article 2B drafters' conclusion that software is 
sufficiently "different" as to render the implied warranty of merchant-
ability impotent in software licensing transactions. 
C. The Demands of Commerce and Technology: 
Of the Fortuity of Tangibility 
Unsurprisingly, Article 2B drafters have depended on the unusual 
qualities of software to justify special warranty treatment for 
82. See, e.g., proposed secticn 2-404, which extends express warranties to remote purchasers 
and transferees. U.C.C. § 2-404 (Discussion Draft, Mar. 1998). 
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non-mass-market licenses. Software is, after all, distinctive, if not unique. 
If this form of property did not have characteristics that set it apart from 
more familiar forms of property, it would not need to be governed by 
newly developed law in the first place. Those engaged in software trans-
actions certainly can establish that the property interests they deal with 
are less familiar than are the traditional property interests dealt with in 
more familiar commercial law contexts. 
Nonetheless, this approach also sets up something of a self-
fulfilling prophecy. To be sure, intellectual property, and particularly 
software, is neither completely goods nor completely services. Software 
is a hybrid, owing incidents to both the tangible and less tangible. This 
tension in the nature of software allows the Article 2B reporter to draw 
on analogies from both the tangible goods law and intangible services 
law to support formulations in the licensing law.83 And the fact that the 
"thing of value," the program, may be transferred either by physical or 
electronic media does lend some support to a warranty scheme that is 
not solely dependent on either the purely tangible or the purely intan-
gible property interest warranties. 84 This train of thought has a crude 
logic, and it can be cast in terms that pay due deference to the rhetoric 
of U.C.C. jurisprudence. After all, the Code should conform to business 
practices, taking into account the course of their evolution and ulti-
mately fixing rules that strike the right commercial balance. ss 
Ultimately, however, there is only false logic in understanding 
Article 2B warranty provisions along lines that track and give substan-
tive legal effect to formal differences such as tangibility. The tangible/ 
intangible distinction is a convenient one, but it lacks the substance that 
the drafters of Article 2B would claim for it. 
Warranty should be determined by the demands of commerce, not 
the fortuity of tangibility. No one has made the case that commerce re-
quires the distinction drawn by Article 2B; no one has demonstrated that 
the justifications for warranty are not present in recurring non-mass-
market software transactions. Indeed, not just efficient commerce, but 
the health of the software industry, may demand even more warranty 
protection for licensees in the software setting, and, hence, an overall 
more licensee-friendly understanding of non-mass-market software's 
"ordinary purpose." 
83. See id. § 2B-403 general notes 1-3. "Article 2B warranties blend three different legal 
traditions." !d. § 2B-403 general note I. One tradition focuses on the result, that the product conforms 
to ordinary standards of performance. The second tradition conceros the process, the contract 
performance, and the third tradition stems from "contracts for informational content." !d. 
84. For the argument that the Article 2 warranty of merchantability does not fit non-mass-
market software transactions, see U.C.C. § 2B-403 general note 4 (Draft, Feb. 1998). 
85. See Gilmore, supra note 79, at 365 ('The task of ... the Code is to state basic principles 
under which business transactions can be carried out."). 
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Cern Kaner and David Pels have concluded that imposing limita-
tions on the warranties of quality attending software licenses undermines 
the software development industry.86 Their critique responds both to an 
overly restricted appreciation of the ordinariness of custom-designed 
software and to arguments that because the market for software is less 
mature than some other areas, the nascent software industry should en-
joy more latitude to create and distribute deficient products. 
Kaner and Pels point out that software developers in fact already do 
sell software that they know is imperfect. 87 But that does not mean that 
such software would be "unmerchantable" under a merchantability test 
such as that found in current Article 2. "Merchantable" does not mean 
"perfect." Indeed, the elegance of the current Article 2 merchantability 
definition is that it is flexible; different quality standards operate in dif-
ferent contexts. The determinative factor in deciding when something is 
fit for its ordinary purpose is whether it will pass without objection in 
the trade.88 And this inquiry is not changed by the fact that there may 
typically be more "bugs" in custom-designed software.89 
After acknowledging that software cannot be perfect-as no good 
subject to Article 2 is expected to be-the authors, nonetheless, con-
clude that substantial merchantability protection may be indispensable 
for the software industry: 
Article 2B makes it too easy for companies to ship products 
with significant, known defects. It provides no meaningful re-
course to the customers of these products. We think that this is 
grievous error. What value is the preservation of "freedom of 
contract'' (for the drafter of an adhesion contract) if the net ef-
fect will be long-term damage to a leading industry? How many 
times do we have to lose, or see crippled, key American indus-
tries before we learn that there is great social value in the protec-
tion of customer satisfaction with American manufacturers?90 
That sentiment, that nothing less than the fortunes of a great American 
industry may be implicated in decisions regarding the substance of 
software warranties, is not mere hyperbole. At the time of Henningsen v. 
86. See Cern Kaner & David L. Pels, Article 2B and Software Customer Dissatisfaction (May 27, 
1997) (last modified Dec. 23, 1997) <http://www.badsoftware.com/stats.htm>. Kaner has worked 
with software for 21 years. He is the senior author of the best-selling book, TEsTING COMPUTER 
SOFTWARE (2d ed. 1993), and a frequent speaker on software quality and customer satisfaction. He 
is also an attorney, and has attended the Article 2B drafting committee meetings since February 1996. 
Pels has managed technical support for software or computer-related hardware for 21 years. The 
authors have been researching and writing a book on software customer satisfaction since 1994. 
87. See id. at lJ 4 ("The vast majority of problems that customers called about were known 
problems, problems that we knew about when we shipped the product."). 
88. See, e.g., Coffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 226 S.E.2d 534 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976). 
89. See Kaner & Pels, supra note 86, at lJ 11. 
90. /d. at lJ 31. 
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Bloomfield Motors,91 the American automobile industry so dominated 
that its trade group, the Automobile Manufacturers Association (the 
AMA), was able to impose contractual provisions on consumers that es-
sentially abrogated a seller's warranty liability.92 
The applicable sales law at that time was the Uniform Sales Act, 
which gave effect to the AMA's strong pro-seller language.93 As noted 
above, the court in Henningsen responded to the AMA form contract 
and the limitations of pre-Code warranty theory by focusing on public 
policy to afford buyers the protection that the contract law had denied 
them. The decades that followed Henningsen saw the decline of that 
American industry, and, at least in part, this was due to the relative de-
cline in quality of domestically-manufactured automobiles.94 Could that 
or something like that happen in response to Article 2B's warranty of 
merchantability for non-mass-market software? Karl Llewellyn's per-
spective may be pertinent. 
D. Llex Llewellyn in Cyberspace 
The jurisprudential view of Karl Llewellyn imported techniques for 
resolving "trouble cases" from the practices of the Cheyenne95 and 
applied them to the most sophisticated transactions of the mid- to late-
twentieth century. Courts have continued to apply U.C.C. sales princi-
ples to increasingly sophisticated transactions and transactors, including 
transfers of technology captured in computer software.96 
Llewellyn's prescience is manifest not just in the durability of his 
statutory formulations, but also, importantly, in his appreciation of the 
limits of commercial codification. He recognized that commercial 
legislation is not so much imposed on transactors as it is a product of 
91. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
92. See text accompanying supra notes 61-63. 
93. Compare Uniform Sales Act§ 15 ("Implied Warranties of Quality"), and§ 71 ("Variation 
of Implied Obligations"), with U.C.C. § 2-316 ("Exclusion or Modification of Warranties"), and § 2-
719 ("Contractual Modification or Limitation of Remedy"). 
94. This is part of the argument made by Kaner & Pels, supra note 86. 
95. Llewellyn discusses "trouble cases" in KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, Tim 
CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 27-29 (1941). 
Llewellyn suggests that courts might analyze such trouble cases in commercial situations using what 
he called, "situation sense." See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and 
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L REv. 395, 397 (1950). See 
generally TWINING, supra note 17, at 216-27 (discussing Llewellyn's general concept of "situation 
sense''). The term "sense of the situation" appears in the comments to section 2-612 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 2-612 cmt 3 (1995). 
96. See, e.g., Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991); RRX Indus., Inc. v. 
Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d. 543 (9th Cir. 1985); NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 
1536 (N.D. Okla 1997); Neilson Bus. Equip. Ctr., Inc. v. ltalo V. Monteleone, 524 A.2d 1172 (Del. 
1987); Richard Haney Ford, Inc. v. Ford Dealer Computer Servs., 461 S.E.2d 282 (Ga. Ct App. 
1995); Communications Groups, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 527 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Civ. Ct 
1988). 
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transactional context. That is, he understood commercial legislation to 
be a function of the commercial context that it would regulate; it must 
respond to existing problems. If a statute affords courts the opportunity 
to apply law that justly balances the rights of contracting parties, those 
courts are more likely to respect that statute. Otherwise, the statute will 
be impotent and ultimately ignored,97 and, as Llewellyn realized, courts 
will look to "covert tools" to strike that fair balance.98 In other words, if 
warranty fails in Article 2B, then courts may be disposed to consult 
other means to fix the rights of the parties, means that might ultimately 
be inimical to the commercial law. 
Just as enhanced warranty protections for buyers have provided the 
means to maintain U.C.C. Article 2's integrity in the face of decisions 
like Henningsen,99 the warranty provisions of Article 2B, if properly 
formulated, could assure that courts would not look for ways to avoid 
limitations on the software licensees' ability to recover when software 
fails. 
The "right" formulation of an implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity in the software licensing context must emerge from the commercial 
context; it cannot be imposed by those who would create the law in a 
manner inconsiderate of transactional dynamics. The drafters of 2B 
have acknowledged that, as of yet, they are unable to come to terms with 
the concept of "ordinary purpose" when software fails. The commer-
cial sales and personal property leasing laws have not stumbled on that 
concept. The Article 2B drafters' failure to appreciate what a software 
warranty of merchantability should look like is not entirely their fault-
the time is simply not ripe; the technology the warranty would govern 
has not achieved repose. A handful of cases cannot support quality de-
terminations regarding a· technology that will change dramatically sev-
eral times over between the time the sponsoring organizations bless 
Article 2B and the last state to adopt it has done so. Grant Gilmore, an 
advocate of the original U.C.C., saw the repose problem confronting 
97. See Gilmore, supra note 52, at 1355 (referring to the Code's "greatest single virtue: a keen 
awareness of the importance of reflecting actual business practice"); see also TwiNING, supra note 
17, at 313-21 (describing the original Code drafters' approach to codifying commercial practice). 
98. Llewellyn expressed concern that, in the absence of section 2-302, courts would tum to 
these "covert tools" in order to avoid unconscionable results contract terms compelled. See John E. 
Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms": Solutions, 39 VAND. L REv. 1307, 1321 (1986) 
("Under the classical theory ... the courts used 'covert tools' to prevent unconscionable results. 
Llewellyn was concerned that the existing judicial process lacked certainty, stability, and 
predictability. He believed that section 2-302 brought this process 'out into the open' .... "). 
According to Llewellyn, "Covert tools are never reliable tools." Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Reviews, 52 
HARV. L REV. 700, 703 (1939) (reviewing 0. PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAw (1937)). 
99. See, e.g., Wright v. Dow Chern., 845 F. Supp. 503,511 (M.D. Tenn. 1993); Ford Motor Co. 
v. Tritt, 430 S.W.2d 778, 781-82 (Ark. 1968); Knipp v. Weinbaum, 351 So. 2d 1081, 1084-85 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1289 (Haw. 1992). 
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transactions that had been settled in the law. His observations in that 
context resonate here: 
[T]he times may well be out of joint for the production of a 
Commercial Code. 
We have noted ... how technological change cracked and 
twisted the traditional structure of sales law and how ... a sud-
den and unexpected mutation in what had been thought to be a 
stable legal form left a codifying statute obsolete before enact-
ment. 
In the present post-war period, following ten years of un-
precedented expansion of the national productive capacity, in-
dustrial and commercial practices are fluid and subject to sudden 
change. It is not hard to demonstrate that change is taking place 
and that the rate of change is accelerating, but when, at what 
point and in what form the economy will achieve relative stabil-
ity, if there is indeed such a prospect at all, is unpredictable. It is, 
however, possible to lay hold of a few straws in the wind. 100 
Gilmore was a curmudgeon too. 
III 
THE CoMPLEMENTARY THEORY: 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE SOFTWARE 
As noted above, when warranty failed transactors in the Article 2 
context, strict products liability ftlled the breach. As our national econ-
omy evolved to the point at which recurring transactions were less often 
accomplished at arms' length, the need for a mechanism to protect 
those who would be injured by products became manifest. Strict prod-
ucts liability was inevitable; it was the necessary result of the evolution in 
the law that attended the increasing impersonalization of contractual 
relationships.101 Strict products liability was not the only reaction to that 
change in the ways of contracting, 102 but it has become perhaps the 
primary means by which the tortification of contracts has been 
100. Gilmore, supra note 52, at 1356-57. 
101. Llewellyn frequently referred to a horse transaction as representing the informal, personal 
transaction as opposed to the contemporary commercial transactions not conducted within "arms' 
length." See TwiNING, supra note 17, at 220 n.71; see also Karl N. Lleweiiyn, Across Sales on 
Horseback, 52 HARV. L REv. 725, 737 (1939); Karl N. Lleweiiyn, The First Stmggle to Unhorse 
Sales, 52 HARv. L. REv. 873 (1939). 
102. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS; PRODUCTS LIABILITY, Foreword by Geoffrey C. 
Hazard, Jr. (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994). 
I d. 
[T]he basic task of legal formulations is to seek an appropriate balance, so far as it can be 
realized in tort law, between providing reasonable protection for consumer and worker 
interests and stating reasonably viable standards of conduct for producers of goods 
.... [D]efinitions [of product defect] reflect the origins of modem products liability in the 
law or warranty and negligence. 
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accomplished. I now examine the authorities that might apply were this 
phenomenon to repeat itself in the Article 2B context. 
In May of 1997, the American Law Institute promulgated the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability. This initiative is the 
first comprehensive restatement treatment of the principles that might 
determine liability between transactors were courts to fmd that contract 
failed to achieve justice between the parties. While the focus of the 
Restatement, and of this liability theory generally, is on personal injury, 
the terms of the Restatement and the principles that undergird it may 
resonate as well in the software licensing context defmed by Article 2B. 
This Part considers the consequences of the new Restatement if 
Article 2B is read as effectively abrogating the implied warranty of mer-
chantability. In brief, where warranty fails, frustrated transactors and 
courts may resort to strict liability theories that heretofore have been 
unnecessary (and perhaps even inconsistent with the warranty theories 
available by analogyl03 in the pre-Article 2B software licensing world). 
A. Deject: On the "Manufacture" and "Design" of Software 
Software that fails may be deemed defective pursuant to the terms 
of the Restatement under two circumstances. First, a product that 
"departs from its intended design even though all possible care was ex-
ercised in the preparation and marketing of the product"104 may be 
deemed to suffer from a manufacturing defect. In other words, there 
would be a manufacturing defect in the software if it departed from its 
intended design. 
A strict products liability action on account of a manufacturing 
defect is available in instances where the merchantability warranty would 
not arise. That is, even if a particular product is deemed not to have 
failed its ordinary purpose, because, for instance, the court determines 
that the product does not have a discernible "ordinary purpose,"105 the 
court could nonetheless determine that the product departed from the 
product's design specifications. 106 
Second, a product may be deemed to suffer a Restatement Section 
2(b) design defect: "[A] product is defective in design when the fore-
seeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the 
103. For a discussion of the intellectual property cases that have relied on the Article 2 
warranties by analogy, see PETER A ALCES & HAROLD F. SEE, THE COMMERCIAL LAW OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY §§ 13.1-13.5 (1994). 
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a) (1997) (defining a 
"manufacturing defect"). 
105. U.C.C. § 2B-403 general note 4 (Draft, Feb. 1998). 
106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. c (1997) (manufacturing defects). 
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seller ... and the omission of the alternative design renders the product 
not reasonably safe."107 
An example may help to illustrate the two types of defects. Sup-
pose that a software developer undertakes to deliver software that will 
cure the "millennium-bug" problem in a licensee's computer systems. 
If the software fails to perform as the parties intended, unfortunate con-
sequences may well follow: the licensee's accounts-receivable records 
may be lost, payroll hopelessly confounded, and security compromised. 
The licensee might plausibly attempt to premise a strict products 
liability action on either a manufacturing or design-defect theory. The 
fit between the two defect theories in the context of software deficiency 
is admittedly uneasy because the facts do not necessarily fit the alterna-
tive defect bases embodied in the Restatement. But while the design-
defect standard seems at first glance to better suit deficient software 
development, a case can be made that the manufacturing-defect test is 
the more appropriate standard. 
Consider first the more obvious alternative: software deficiency as 
design defect. If the millennium-bug software fails, the disappointed 
licensee may complain that the failure could have been avoided by a 
"reasonable alternative design." That formulation in fact may in some 
cases impose on the licensor a duty greater than that captured in the 
2B-403 implied warranty of merchantability. If the licensor is liable for 
not utilizing a reasonable alternative design, licensors will need to be 
certain that they have considered all alternative designs that licensee's 
experts may establish at trial would have been reasonable. If the licensor 
is held only to a fit-for-ordinary-purpose standard, the licensor could 
establish in response to the warranty action that the software was fit for 
the ordinary purpose even if it was not fit for the extraordinary pur-
poses of the licensee. But the licensor may well be able to argue success-
fully that a reasonable alternative design would not have avoided the 
problems caused by the deficient software.108 
A court, however, could review the software deficiency instead in 
terms of the manufacturing-defect theory. Here, the court need only 
conclude that the software failed because the program was actually built 
deficiently; that the execution of an admittedly reasonable software de-
sign was flawed. Such reasoning calls for a subtle distinction between 
the two senses of "design." That is, it envisions design of software as 
more akin to the manufacture of a product than to the design of a 
product. This distinction is supported by the fact that a "bug" in soft-
ware can be corrected (much like a manufacturing defect-e.g., a 
107. !d. § 2(b). 
108. For a general discussion of this issue, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTS § 2 cmt. f 
(1997). 
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cracked casing-can be corrected), and the software would not have 
been designed to include the bug, the admitted deficiency. 109 
There may not be a great deal of light between composition and 
design in the software-development context, and one may find uncon-
vincing the distinction drawn above. But an aggressive court may not 
need much reason to impose strict products liability on a licensor. And, 
as noted in the discussion of Article 2, any perceived impotence of the 
implied warranty of merchantability provision may provide courts all 
the incentive they need.no 
Once the defect issue is resolved, there are still other elements of 
the strict products liability theory that must be confronted to make sense 
of the Restatement's application to defective software. The next few 
Sections consider the remaining threshold issues. 
B. The "Tangible" Property Requirement 
Section 19 of the Restatement limits the scope of strict products 
liability law to "tangible personal property" and to "[o]ther items 
... when the context of their distribution and use is sufficiently analo-
gous to the distribution and use of tangible personal property that it is 
appropriate to apply the rules stated in this Restatement."m While it 
would be difficult to force licensed software into the "tangible-
personal-property" category, licensing of software is sufficiently analo-
gous to the transfer of tangible personal property to support the appli-
cation of strict products liability principles. 
The comments to Restatement section 19 draw a distinction, in the 
case of intangible property, between intangible property in the form of 
information (akin to the subject matter of section 2B-404), which 
109. I am indebted to Professor David Frisch for this observation. 
110. Cf Esco1a v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring). Traynor wrote: 
The inference of negligence may be dispelled by an affirmative showing of proper care 
.... An injured person, however, is not ordinarily in a position to refute such evidence or 
identify the cause of the defect, for he can hardly be familiar with the manufacturing 
process as the manufacturer himself is. In leaving it to the jury to decide whether the 
inference has been dispelled, regardless of the evidence against it, the negligence rule 
approaches the rule of strict liability. It is needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis 
of recovery and impose what is in reality liability without negligence. If public policy 
demands that a manufacturer of goods be responsible for their quality regardless of 
negligence there is no reason not to fix that responsibility openly. 
ld. See also Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1185 {Wash. 1972), in which the Washington 
Supreme Court held, 
!d. 
The rule of strict liability rests not only upon the ultimate idea of rectifying a wrong and 
putting the burden where it should belong as a matter of abstract justice, that is, upon the 
one of the two innocent parties whose acts instigated or made the harm possible, but it also 
rests on problems of proof .... 
111. RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS § 19(a) {1997). 
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clearly would not be the type of intangible property contemplated by 
the 2B-403(b) warranty, on the one hand, and "[t]he second major 
category of intangible, harm-causing products [that] involves the trans-
mission of intangible forces such as electricity and X rays,"112 on the 
other. The subject matter of the 2B-403(b) implied warranty is more 
like the intangible that "involves the transmission of intangibles forces" 
than it is like information. This conclusion is supported by the distinc-
tion drawn in Article 2B between sections 2B-403 (computer programs 
that process data) and 2B-404 (information).113 The proposed statute 
itself tracks the lines of the distinction drawn coincidentally in the 
Restatement. In fact, the Restatement comment further supports this line 
of argument by noting that, although when electricity "enters the cus-
tomer's premises" it is a product, "before passing the meter" it is a 
service.114 Similarly when the defective software is installed in the licen-
see's computer system, it becomes a product. 
C. "Property Other Than the Defective Product Itself' 
The Restatement provides that the seller of a defective product may 
be liable for personal injury as well as for harm to "the plaintiff's 
property other than the defective product itself."115 Applied to the soft-
ware licensing context in the terms posited above, that would mean that 
when the software fails and the millennium-bug nightmare materializes, 
the licensor would be liable for the licensee's loss of the value of its ac-
counts-receivable records. The licensor would not, however, be liable on 
a products liability theory for the difference in the value of the software 
for which the licensee contracted and the software licensor tendered. 
And, it might also avoid liability for the damage to other software pro-
grams or other systems compromised by the defective software. But the 
loss of the accounts-receivable records would constitute harm to 
"plaintiff's property other than the defective product itself," and would 
be recoverable on the strict products liability theory. Further, the com-
ment to section 21 makes clear that "characterization of a claim as 
harm to other property may trigger liability not only for the harm to 
physical property but also for incidental economic loss. "116 
To an extent, the contours of the limitation imposed by the "harm-
to-other-property" requirement have been determined by the substance 
of the otherwise available warranty protections heretofore provided by 
Article 2 of the U.C.C. The fact that the products liability law entrusts to 
112. /d. § 19 cmt d. 
113. See U.C.C. §§ 2B-403, 2B-404 (Draft, Mar. 1998). 
114. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 19 cmt d (1997). 
115. !d. § 21(c). 
116. /d. § 21 cmt. e. 
HeinOnline -- 87 Cal L. Rev. 303 1999
1999] W(H)ITHER WARRANTY 303 
the Article 2 warranties the protection of property interests not vindi-
cated by the Restatement's formulation may perhaps be best understood 
as a creature of the Article 2 warranties' fundamental integrity. But 
once the warranty protections of Article 2 are unavailable to a buyer, 
here licensee, it might well not be appropriate to construe too broadly 
the "other-property" limitation. 
D. The Curious Result That Would Remain 
To emphasize the incoherence of a regime that would need to find 
quality protection for licensees in the strict products liability law, and to 
demonstrate the incongruity of reading the Article 2B implied warranty 
of merchantability too narrowly, we must recognize the result of apply-
ing both section 2B-403 and strict products liability theory to the fol-
lowing case: imagine software failing; as a result of that failure, the 
software being rendered worthless; the failure damaging the licensee's 
other software; and, lastly, the failure harming the licensee because the 
failure destroys the licensee's accounts-receivable records. If the courts 
were left with no choice but to provide licensees recovery under a strict 
products liability theory, then we would confront the curious result that 
the licensee could recover for the lost accounts-receivables records but 
not for the loss of the value of the defective software itself or for the 
casualty to other software or systems damaged by the defective software. 
E. Conclusion 
Certainly the innovation suggested here-which would require 
courts to infer from limitations in the non-mass-market software implied 
warranty of merchantability a recovery theory that uses tort principles to 
redress the failure of contract-would test the limits of the strict prod-
ucts liability theory. My argument is that the implied warranty of mer-
chantability in Article 2B should be construed to provide real protection 
to custom-designed software licensees. To the extent that there may be 
differences between the application of parallel commercial law formula-
tions, those differences should be the product of substantial distinctions 
in the coincident subject matter. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article, admittedly composed by one who is, to say the least, 
skeptical of the Article 2B project, has posited a conception of deficient 
products law that attempts to be true to the Llewellynesque tradition. 
That is, the thesis urged here is based on the conclusion that all law 
emerges in context, and once a liability theory has seen the light of day, 
the courts (at the insistence of transactors) are wont to give that theory 
root in any available transactional soil. 
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The arguments of those who would insulate licensors from liability 
may well backfire, and the construction of the products liability law 
offered here provides one means to undermine the licensor lobby's 
best-laid plans. Make no mistake: courts may look to products liability 
theory even once the software licensing law formulates a real warranty 
of merchantability. But a substantial implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity can minimize this look to tort and, consequently, increase certainty 
for all parties. 
The emergence of such a warranty truly in context may take time. 
Because the software licensor lobby has rushed the promulgation of 
uniform software licensing law, formulating industry protective legisla-
tion before the subject technology and transactional patterns have ma-
tured to the point at which a "sense of the situation" and "immanent 
justice" can crystallize, the courts may well be deprived of the sort of 
substantial warranty that can minimize resort to tort. Hence, courts may 
need to fmd and apply other theories that vindicate licensees' rights. 
Ultimately, then, it may quite ironically be the case that the licensors 
who have been so eager to insulate their business from the too aggres-
sive use of licensee-friendly recovery theories may have to contend with 
the uncertainties of a strict products liability calculus. This is the case, 
quite simply, because their industry has not yet become sufficiently 
"ordinary" to make an implied warranty of merchantability theory of 
recovery viable. If the drafters of Proposed Article 2B are right, if they 
have asked the right questions and determined that the warranty of mer-
chantability is impotent in this setting, then, in fact, they have presented 
what may be the best argument for the application of products liability 
theory: the implied warranty of merchantability, even conscientiously 
drawn, is currently impotent in this setting. And this, I posit, counsels 
delaying codification until we have reached the Llewellynesque 
moment. 
